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Chapter 7 
 
 
 
CHINA’S ECO-CIVILIZATION:  
FROM HISTORY TO POLICY 
 
 
R. James Ferguson 
Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies,  
Bond University, Gold Coast, Australia 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The modern Chinese public has demonstrated a growing ecological 
awareness, driven in part by the impact of rapid industrialisation and 
related pollution trends that have directly undermined societal health and 
well-being. The PRC government recognizes the real costs of 
environmental degradation in the face of rising energy needs and societal 
expectations unleased through the “China Dream” of recent years. The 
linking of large segments of economic, energy, developmental, social and 
foreign-relations policy under an integrated rubric had already emerged via 
earlier “harmonious society” and “harmonious world” doctrines. This 
approach has gained extended government endorsement under Xi Jinping 
through 2013–2018. The construction of an Ecological Civilization, first 
formally taken up from 2007, has now been given the status of a National 
Development Strategy and has been further embedded in the 13th Five-Year 
Plan for 2016-2020 and gained extra endorsement in major meetings of the 
CPC (Chinese Communist Party) and the NPC (National People’s 
Congress) in early 2018. Behind this debate stands the long-term 
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engagement of Chinese civilization with its environmental and productive 
base. Renowned as pioneers in irrigation and agricultural expansion, early 
Chinese states developed philosophies directly supportive of agriculture as 
the “root” on which the other branches of the society and state were 
established. The difficulty of maintaining a large peasant (farming) 
population on the land without excessive human and environmental 
exploitation, however, became a major dilemma for all imperial dynasties. 
This tension has found expression today in the challenge of providing food 
security and rural livelihoods during periods of intensified industrialization 
and urbanization. This will remain one of the major challenges for a truly 
Ecological Civilization in the 21st century, whether in China or elsewhere. 
 
Keywords: agriculture, China, ecological civilization, food security, 
pollution, sustainable development 
 
 
DANGEROUS ASSUMPTIONS: THE ANTHROPOCENE AND 
ECO-CIVILIZATION 
 
The idea that major states should take up the mantle of advancing an 
eco-civilization has gained conceptual traction in the last three decades. This 
has included serious academic and policy analysis, paralleling the proposal 
that we are now in an Anthropocene age increasingly shaped by human 
activity, an idea popularised by the atmospheric chemist and Nobel Prize 
winner Paul Crutzen, along with his colleague Eugene Stoermer (Crutzen 
and Schwagerl 2011; Crutzen 2002; Crutzen and Stoermer 2000). This was 
based on the increasing impact and agency of humans in planetary terms: 
humans appropriating a substantial share of net biomass primary production 
(circa 27 - 44% down through 2050 in some estimates), exploiting over 30% 
of the land surface, the impact of the “Colombian exchange” as diverse 
species are redistributed across the planet, and the cumulative impact of the 
industrial revolution on climate change (Krausman et al. 2013; Sachs 2007; 
Crutzen 2002). Regardless of controversies as to the exact start of this 
Anthropocene (with the gradual development of agriculture, at the onset of 
industrial age in the late 18th century, a starting point proposed by Paul 
Crutzen, or the ‘great acceleration’ of the post-World War II period), this 
change in human agency now requires active governance of global eco-
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systems and planetary environmental resources (Delanty and Mota 2017; 
Crutzen 2002). As already noted in an early research note by Paul Crutzen 
and Eugene Stoermer:  
 
To develop a world-wide accepted strategy leading to sustainability of 
ecosystems against human induced stresses will be one of the great future 
tasks of mankind, requiring intensive research efforts and wise application 
of the knowledge thus acquired in the noösphere, better known as 
knowledge or information society. An exciting, but also difficult and 
daunting task lies ahead of the global research and engineering community 
to guide mankind towards global, sustainable, environmental management. 
(Crutzen and Stoermer 2000, 18). 
 
It also suggests a necessary change to instrumental thinking and related 
social values, leading towards a new cultural and technological base that can 
grow alongside the Earth’s biological diversity rather than depleting or 
consuming it (Crutzen and Schawgerl 2011). It is these factors that have led 
to a changed intellectual climate and allowed the push towards 
implementing and funding the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement (even 
without US support) and the concurrent widespread adoption of the 
Sustainable Development Goals. For Delanty and Mota (2017, 34) such 
transitions are best managed by deliberative cosmopolitan political 
approaches that link the structure of human societies with geopolitical and 
“planetary boundaries” in which “the human world is re-imagined culturally 
and politically in terms of its relation with the Earth”.  
A parallel trend engaged the idea of an Ecological Civilization, based 
on the proposal of an ecological society and radical democratization, 
developed by Roy Morrison (Morrison 1995, 11-18; Huan 2016). In a 
minimal form it has been loosely defined in Western scholarship as 
sustainable development in the context of a fully modern and industrialized 
society which emphasizes “green energy, a minimal global-footprint, 
carbon-free degrowth” and sustained ecological systems (Oswald 2014). In 
socialist forms it includes the need to restrain unlimited economic growth 
and capital accumulation, the move towards a more equitable society with 
modest goals, and the harmonization of production in order to “maintain 
biological and habitat diversity” within “a functioning and thriving 
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ecosystem” (Magdoff 2012). This nexus of environmental and socialist 
concerns has also led to a vigorous critique of the capitalist system and its 
dominant historical narratives and ideas of development, including the role 
of global corporations and the limited ability of government and IGOs to 
manage emerging social and environmental crises (Korten 2017). 
Unfortunately, this movement has been less successful in demonstrating 
technical and political alternatives that can be adopted and implemented 
within realistic timeframes. Partial reflections of this concern for resilient 
ecologies, “circular economies” and sustainable societies are found in 
current trends within Climate Change negotiations (seeking rapid transition 
to low-carbon societies) and the Sustainable Development Goals that allow 
for humane adaptation to ecological constraints (Wilts 2016; UNEP 2016). 
However, the most explicit governmental mobilisation of the idea of an 
“eco-civilization” can be found in 21st century policies of the People’s 
Republic of China (see below). 
There are some problematic conceptual assumptions in these general 
formulations. Being an eco-civilization is not a choice. All human societies 
rely on the environment for their economic, subsistence and resource needs, 
in turn affecting the ecology in which they are situated. Historical analysis 
suggests that societal formations at times are shaped directly by their original 
environmental context or by being situated across ecological boundaries. 
Thus, the evolution of large civilizational complexes in river basins that can 
carry agricultural surpluses and high human populations (as in Egypt, 
Sumeria, diverse Indus civilizations, and across northern China) has been a 
focus of analysis since Karl Wittfogel’s 1957 work on hydraulic civilizations 
(Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study on Total Power). Likewise, the 
interaction of nomad communities with state formation across stressed 
steppe and desert fringes has been a major theme in explaining long-term 
trends in Chinese, Eurasian and Middle Eastern civilizations (Di Cosmo 
2009; Ward-Perkins 2005; Barfield 1989; Grousset 2010; Lattimore 1940). 
Though these early accounts have since  
 
been criticized and updated, the fundamental interaction of changing 
environmental and societal conditions has been reinforced, showing direct 
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and powerful influences from climate change, resource scarcity and disease 
vectors on the evolution of specific human societies (Squatriti 2010).  
The implicit presumption of some early accounts has been that long-
living historical societies somehow functioned in harmony with their 
environment to manage their resources effectively. Unfortunately, this 
assumption tends to conceal several dangerous trends within such 
civilizational complexes. These include rapid growth in population and 
resource exploitation during good years until unsustainable maxima are 
achieved, leading to follow-on crises in societal well-being impacted by 
environmental triggers and related economic and political stresses (possible 
factors in the so-called Intermediate Periods of Egypt); high levels of 
population living in sustainable poverty (“hungry homeostasis”) while soil 
and ecological resources are gradually eroded; and ongoing pressure on 
viable river systems, as has occurred for the Indus, Brahmaputra, Nile, 
Jordan, and Yellow rivers, as well as for the Aral Sea basin (Bevan et al. 
2017; Lee and Zhang 2013; Brewer 2012, 124-142; Butz 2012; ICA 2012; 
Fu et al. 2006).  
Likewise, the assumption of natural stability and unchanging harmony 
in traditional human ecosystems is not supported by the growing 
understanding of the dynamic nature of earth-processes: extreme weather 
fluctuations (e.g., the El Niño and La Niña cycles across the Pacific Ocean), 
the possible impact of major volcanic events in shaping early human 
societies, the role of global warming periods in radically changing 
environmental conditions, and an ongoing sixth mass extinction with serious 
implications for human civilization (Ceballos et al. 2017; Delanty and Mota 
2017; Doocy et al. 2013; Williams 2012; for limitations to some of these 
theories, see Yost et al. 2018). The problem is not of being an eco-
civilization, but of becoming a sustainable Ecological Civilization with high 
levels of environmental protection, human development, adaptive resilience 
and positive societal evolution. This is not a simple issue of being in 
harmony with nature nor of managing environmental carrying power in the 
face of rising human expectations.  
Although efforts have been made to link current ecological needs with 
traditional notions of harmony between humans and nature, as found in 
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Confucianism and Taoism, this link is somewhat indirect. The logic of 
Confucianism argues that humans were enmeshed within a Heaven-Human-
Earth triad and that the creative collaboration of these three forces indicated 
the conditions of good governance (Ferguson amd Dellios 2017a). This 
suggests that governance had to concern itself with cosmological factors that 
shaped the wider human environment, while for neo-Confucian thinkers 
such as Zhang Zai (1020-1077), the Earth was seen as the “mother,” and 
humans should have a concern for all creatures and things as companions 
(Li 2003). These connections have since been revived by thinkers such as 
Tu Weiming, seeking to build bridges between contemporary Confucian 
ethics and new models of human development (Tu 2004; Dellios 2018). 
However, the Heaven-Human-Earth triad is more a cosmological conception 
than an ecological one, with limited understanding of underlying biological 
processes. Likewise, government promotion of a Beautiful China (UNEP 
2016) is as much based on aesthetic and marketing grounds as on 
environmental ones (Yao 2014). Building a positive eco-civilization needs 
to go beyond these general orientations. It requires a complex understanding 
of dynamic interactions amid changing ecological conditions, evolving 
human developmental needs, and the complex web of political interactions 
that constitute national resilience and global governance.  
 
 
CHINA’S ECOLOGICAL CIVILIZATION CONSTRUCTION 
 
Over the last decade the Chinese government has come to recognize the 
serious costs of environmental degradation accelerated by industrialization, 
rising national needs and the societal expectations unleased through 
modernization and the ‘China Dream’ agenda operating since 2013. The 
linking of economic, energy, development, social and foreign-relations 
policy under an integrated rubric has in part been managed through the 
concept of China as an evolving eco-civilization. The core aim can be 
summarized as “to balance the relationship between humanity and nature, 
which includes economic development, population, resources and the 
environment” (Climate Group 2014). It was seen as one of the necessary 
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pillars of development, which should be “innovative, coordinated, green, 
open and shared” (UNEP 2016, 3). This approach gained intellectual traction 
through the 1980s and 1990s, was initiated at the policy level as early as 
October 2007 at the 17th Congress of the CPC, was further articulated in the 
Central Committee of the CPC’s working report of 2012, and gained 
extended government endorsement under the leadership of Xi Jinping (Huan 
2016). The construction of an Ecological Civilization has been given the 
status of a National Development Strategy, is embedded in the 13th Five-
Year Plan (for 2016-2020), and gained further endorsement in major 
meetings of the CPC and the National People’s Congress through 2017-2018 
(Xinhuanet 2015).  
China has grappled with the balance between human needs and 
environmental management for millennia. Renowned as pioneers in 
irrigation and agricultural expansion, early Chinese states developed 
philosophies and policies directly supportive of agriculture as the root on 
which the other branches of the society and state were established. The 
difficulty of maintaining a growing population on the land without excessive 
human and environmental exploitation, however, became a major challenge 
for all imperial dynasties. Today, this has transformed into the contemporary 
challenge of boosting national wealth, increasing GDP per capita, providing 
energy and food security, ensuring rural livelihoods and avoiding massive 
pollution and related health costs during periods of intensified 
industrialization and urbanization (Tracy et al. 2017). These factors have 
turned China’s quest for a truly Ecological Civilization in the 21st century 
into a national necessity rather than an optional aspiration. Since China 
remains the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter and the most populous 
state, it generates crucial implications for global environmental 
sustainability, climate change policy and the UN’s Sustainable Development 
Goals. 
China’s viewpoint was not just focused on the end product of a 
sustainable eco-civilization but the process of eco-civilization construction 
(shengtaiwenming jianshe) that included the transformation toward a 
“socialist eco-civilization” in which social justice and ecological 
sustainability are combined (Huan 2016, 51, 60). Eco-civilization 
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construction thus became a central goal “alongside economic growth, 
political modernisation, social development and social construction” (Huan 
2016, 54). Major documents that elucidated these policies included the 
Decision to Comprehensively Deepen the Reform of Several Major Issues of 
2013 and the Integrated Reform Plan for Promoting Ecological Progress of 
2015 (PRC 2015; Huan 2016). However, rather than rigid definitions or set 
of benchmarks, eco-civilization remains a conceptual and political approach 
to a range of developmental and environmental issues: 
 
At the level of philosophy and ethics, eco-civilization is a weak eco-
centrist (environmentally friendly) natural or ecological relation value and 
morality; at the level of political ideology, eco-civilization is an alternative 
economic and social formula differing from the dominating capitalist one; 
at the practical level, eco-civilization construction refers to the part of 
appropriate relations between humans and nature throughout the process 
of creating a socialist civilization, or the governments’ daily-work of 
ecological and environmental protection; in the specific context of 
modernization and development, eco-civilization construction refers to the 
green dimension of socialist modernization and economic and social 
development. What I want to emphasize is that, while talking about eco-
civilization, we should notice both the double dimensions of theory and 
practice and the double dimensions of “deep-green” and “red–green” 
perspectives (Huan 2016, 56). 
 
At present, China’s Eco-Civilization represents a mix of aspiration, 
policy formation, and limited implementation. It has begun to be integrated 
into the environmental planning in each five-year plan and other key policy 
documents, leading to a mainstreaming of environmental issues in 
government and public awareness. Since 2007, approximately 4000 articles 
and books and over 170,000 media articles have been published on the 
concept, and China has 6,000 organizations related to environmental issues, 
with 700 being registered NGOs, though overseas funding of such groups is 
now tightly regulated, and many might be viewed more as GONGOs 
(government-oriented NGOs) rather than independent civil society 
organisations (Heurtebise 2017; UNEP 2016; Economy 2018). 
From 2013, China began considering the boundaries for environmental 
sustainability and is developing a system of Ecological Protection Red Lines 
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(EPRLs), based on crucial protecting ecological functions and sensitive 
areas, with thresholds established for different areas and land-usage patterns 
(Economy 2018;  Huan 2016; Tracy et al. 2017; UNEP 2016). Systems of 
eco-compensation, along with green credit and emission trading schemes are 
being gradually implemented after pilot projects run from 2013 (PRC 2015 
Sections 42-43; Qi and Chang 2018; Haun 2016; Tracy et al. 2017; UNEP 
2016). Enforcement of environmental protection laws have increased, both 
in terms of fines and criminal prosecutions, since 2014, while there has been 
the progressive empowerment of the PRC’s State Forestry Administration 
from 2003 and enlargement of the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(first elevated in 2008 into a cabinet ministry) as the Ministry of Ecology 
and the Environment as of 2018 (Huan 2016; Tracy et al. 2017; UNEP 2016; 
Zhang et al. 2017; EU – China Environmental Governance Programme 
2014; Economy 2018). There has been a more extensive use of EIAs 
(Environmental Impact Studies), especially across key development zones 
in coastal areas, with national level projects involving more than $117.4 
billion across project sectors such as “transport, electric power, steel and 
nonferrous metal, coal and chemical engineering, and petrochemical 
industries” (UNEP 2016, 19). There have also been recommendations made 
to expand the use of EIAs in China’s Going Global agenda, its South-South 
Cooperation strategies and along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), though 
this is still an area that needs tighter governance (Tracy et al. 2017; Ferguson 
2018; UNEP 2016). 
In 2015, the PRC committed itself to achieve a peak of carbon dioxide 
emissions by 2030 (if not earlier) to lower carbon dioxide emissions per unit 
of GDP (carbon intensity) by 60% to 65% from the 2005 level and to 
increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to circa 
20%, targeting an interim rise to 15% by 2020 (Department of Climate 
Change 2015; Tracy et al. 2017; Huan 2016; UNEP 2016). China has made 
large investments in renewable energy sources (from 2016 these were larger 
than the EU or US), especially in solar and wind power, including 
investment in hydro-resources, although electricity production still remains 
heavily reliant on coal power plants and to some degree nuclear power 
stations (Economy 2018). This will be supplemented by an emerging system 
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of “green finance,” with China accounting for 40% of global renewable 
capacity through 2017, and China’s National Energy Administration 
planning to spend $360 billion on renewable power by 2020 (Turner 2018; 
IEA 2017; PRC 2015, Sections 45-46; Hood 2017). China also plans the 
ongoing construction of some 230 eco-cities within the country, improving 
shortcomings to transform China’s urban environments and reduce their 
carbon and energy footprints, although concerns have been expressed with 
regard to the reality of environmental gains made in some earlier projects 
(e.g., failing eco-cities such as Dongtan and Nahui, Li and Yang 2015; Tracy 
et al. 2017; Pow 2017; Chang 1987). More comprehensive approaches are 
also being developed for city spatial management, land-use and 
environmental protection, with Xiamen (Fujian province) as one early 
testing point among 28 cities and counties (UNEP 2016). Alongside this, 
China has begun an enhanced plan for protected environmental areas 
(covering 1.7 million square kms with 1.47 million square kms of nature 
reserves), plus large scale reforestation programs, such as in Xinjiang, along 
the fringes of the Gobi (the ‘Green Great Wall’ program), and parts of the 
northwest, as well as logging bans in northeast provinces (Huan 2016; Tracy 
et al. 2017). 
The PRC’s Eco-Civilization is not a narrow national agenda, since 
China is now deeply engaged in the capitalist global economy, with exports 
and two-way flows of investment important aspects of sustained economic 
growth (in 2006, the share of exports in China’s GDP was 18.61% (Statistica 
2018a). The green-left and ecological Marxist positions argue that the 
capitalist system, with its emphasis on economic growth, means that China 
needs to work towards an alternative path of modernization that will 
influence global trends of production and living (Huan 2016, 62; Wang 
2006; Gare, 2008, 2012). One path for reform was seen as the linking of state 
power and popular participation on environmental issues, drawing in both 
traditional culture and socialist values (Yu in Gare 2012). Likewise, from 
implementation at the national level, it will be crucial to see whether China 
will actively support the greening of the economic corridors in its 
international investment and trade. This is especially important for the 
evolution of the BRI, with concerns that PRC’s economic reform will push 
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polluting industries and production into poor partner countries (Tracy et al. 
2017; Economy 2018; Ferguson 2018).  
The scale of the challenges facing China and its partners in establishing 
an Eco-Civilization can be seen in just one aspect of this problem: creating 
a sustainable agricultural system and secure food supply. Historically, the 
Chinese polity, as a set of institutions and social technologies, became a 
master at expanding its resource base, but only at massive human and 
environmental costs. Likewise, today, the twin impacts of increasing 
urbanisation and ecological damage have made food and environmental 
security major concerns even for a relatively affluent PRC.  
 
 
CHINA’S PROBLEMATIC MASTERY OF  
AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES   
 
China emerged as a major agricultural civilization able to master 
hydraulic techniques and use diverse food sources, including the expansion 
of different types of grain production. The traditional five grains were 
rapidly expanded into a wider range of varieties and staples (Wang 2006), 
allowing for intensified production of crops in both northern and southern 
China. In early China, intensive agriculture and irrigation were key skills 
traditionally viewed as laid down by the mythical founder, the Yellow 
Emperor’ (Huangdi), and other cultural heroes. Early traditions included 
notions of the proper use of resources within seasonal cycles, thereby 
avoiding overexploitation of fisheries and forests (Li 2003). In parallel, from 
the third millennium BCE a growing core of Chinese culture began to shape 
a shared cultural system, expanding out from the core areas near the Yellow 
and Wei Rivers, with early interactions along the Yangtze River basin and 
into Sichuan (Yan et al. 2012; Ferguson and Dellios 2017a). On this basis, 
the rapid expansion of China’s early population was due in part to the 
construction of enduring political systems that could utilize expanded 
agricultural resources and to the replication of the social knowledge needed 
to utilise that environment (Ferguson 2004).  
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Though many classic Chinese institutions had been developed in the first 
millennium BCE and were entrenched by the time of the Han Dynasty (206 
BCE – 220 CE), it was only thereafter that extended territories could be 
opened up to the west and south through intensified agricultural exploitation. 
From the Sui and Tang dynasties this included increasingly higher 
population and rice production levels in Southern China (Wang 2006). 
During periods of stability, household numbers could grow considerably. 
For example, in one estimate, the number of households in 629 CE was over 
3.1 million with a likely population of  13.2 million, and by 755 it had grown 
to 8.9 million households with a population of around 52.9 million (Wang 
2006, 144-145). Such growth in population, extended in the Song dynasty, 
was aided by a number of factors beyond simple birth/death rates, including 
immigration from the north, incentives to clear and register waste land, 
careful financing, management of labour and tenants, and improved 
agricultural practices, including better fertilizers, irrigation to reduce salt and 
alkaline content, multi-cropping and comprehensive land use, issues already 
dealt with in texts such as Cheng Pu’s On Farming, written circa 1149 
(Wang 2006).  
During the Tang period, laws were passed to encourage self-employed 
farmers to open up land and to legalize its ownership or use, though this 
trend was disturbed by the An-Shi (An Lushan) rebellion of the mid-eighth 
century. Moreover, land reclamation in the Song period of farmland peaked 
at 100.8 million acres, indicating a serious expansion of agricultural 
resources (Wang 2006, 149-160). Along with more open, integrated and 
commercially active cities, this laid the basis in gradually increasing 
maximum populations for the following unified dynasties. During the High 
Qing period population levels rose rapidly, from a low of 88.5 million in 
1646 (after the collapse of the Ming dynasty), aided by a warm temperature 
phase, expansion and resumption of farmlands, and increased agricultural 
yields down towards the end of the 18th century (Lee and Zhang 2013). By 
1850-1851, the population had already reached circa 410-440 million, based 
on adjusted census figures (for problems in making exact estimates, see Lee 
and Zhang 2013). Recorded population collapses would occur during 
periods of intense political chaos, such as at the fall of the Ming Dynasty 
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(early 17th century) and in the later Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864), with 
cycles of climate change and temperature factors affecting periods of 
agricultural expansion and population recovery (Lee and Zhang 2013). This 
19th century population still relied on successful and stable agricultural 
production, augmented by emerging industries (including textiles and 
mining), enhanced transport links, and the development of commerce and 
banks (Fenby 2008; Ferguson and Dellios 2017a; Ji 2003)  
For traditional Chinese political thought agriculture rather than industry 
or trade always remained the first branch or root of the wealth of a kingdom, 
views put forward by Confucius and thinkers such as Jia Yi of the second 
century BCE. This would influence Han and later imperial institutions, with 
agronomy the foundation (ben) as a science of state and the basis of 
legitimate rule (Bray 2008; Shouyi 1982). Likewise, various strands of 
Taoist thought saw in the small village the prototype of the largest natural 
human community, and thinkers such as Xu Xing (Hsü Hsing), a 
contemporary of Mencius, promoted the idea of communism and 
agricultural socialism (Mei 1934). The Mohists, too, argued for agriculture 
as the basis of society and for frugal, utilitarian government that would not 
waste human lives or effort (Watson 1958). A direct recognition of the 
fundamental role of agriculture and need to maintain a stable government 
and farming population is found in the Analects of Confucius (12.11) where 
Duke Jing of Qi asks about proper government. Confucius replies: “Let the 
ruler be a ruler, the subject a subject, the father a father, the son a son.” In 
other words, the ruler and ruled should take on the necessary roles and 
responsibilities for a functioning society. The questioner, the Duke of Jing, 
then replies to Confucius: “Splendid! Truly, if the ruler be not a ruler, the 
subject not a subject, the father not a father, the son not a son, then even if 
there be grain, would I get to eat it?” (Confucius 2012). This principle, 
known as the “rectification of names,” implies that a failure to live up to 
social roles would result in political and economic chaos. Failures in 
planting, harvesting and distribution of staples for any reason, including 
droughts, floods and wars, were a disaster for any dynasty (Dellios and 
Ferguson 2013). 
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Concern for the survival and basic welfare of the people had already 
become a commonplace feature in the thought of Confucius, Mencius, Xunzi 
(Hsün Tzu) Mozi (Mo Tzu) and Lao Tzu, and became one of the criteria for 
judging the morality of a government and its long-term stability (Dellios and 
Ferguson 2013; Chang 1987). However, in reality, maintaining a satisfied 
tier of agriculturalists was always problematic for the Chinese empire. 
Imperial administrations were aware that times of famine and drought were 
also the times when rebellion and revolution prospered. Rural rebellions 
with a peasant component were recorded as early as the revolt of 209 BCE, 
inspired by Ch’en She (a hired field worker) who rounded up border guards 
and people of “the most humble origin” against the Qin (Watson 1958; for 
limitations of the term peasant to Chinese conditions, largely based on free 
small farmers, see Mote 1999, 365). Imperial China thereafter had to 
contend with recurring rural revolts, the most determined of which was that 
of the Yellow Turbans, from 184 CE onwards, in which major armies, 
numbering in the hundreds of thousands, managed to destabilise imperial 
rule in large areas of China for decades (Shouyi 1982; Fitzgerald 1965). 
These rural revolts were the bane of dynasties which attempted to extract 
high levels of taxation and labour without adequate attention to the 
agricultural and human resources of the country. They emerged as a major 
problem under the Eastern Han dynasty (25-220 CE) and recurred in later 
periods, such as major revolts in the 860s and 870s, while in 880 rebel forces 
even managed to capture Chang’an, the capital of the Tang dynasty (Shouyi 
1982). Major revolts also occurred in 920, 993-995, and 1120-1127 CE, 
while from 1130 the Red Jackets promoted ideas of “equality between the 
high and the low” and equal distribution of wealth between the rich and the 
poor. From 1343 to 1362, the army of the Red Scarves (or Red Turbans) 
managed to mobilise over a hundred thousand disgruntled farmers and 
labourers, but were crushed largely due to their internal divisions during a 
period of contending warlords (Mote 1999, 529-533; Shouyi 1982, 258-
304). 
Rural revolts were also one of the main factors in the decline of the Ming 
dynasty. The interesting use of the title King of the Levellers used by one of 
their leaders, Deng Maoqi (1448-9 CE) indicates that some of these revolts 
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were based on consciousness of the exploitation and inequality forced on 
sectors of the Chinese population (Shouyi 1982, 258-368). Secret societies 
such as the White Lotus Society, the Heaven and Earth Society (also known 
as the Triad Society) and First Heaven remained active from the 17th century 
through to the early 19th centuries, and were associated with resistance to 
exploitation by landlords and corrupt government officials (Mote 1999; 
Shouyi 1982). Although the long term effect of these revolts was limited, 
they helped undermine the pattern of serfdom, presaging more radical 
transformations of social relations in the 19-20th centuries (Elvin 1973). 
Both the Taiping revolutionary forces and the later Yi He Tuan (Militia 
United in Righteousness) movement (more commonly known as the Boxers) 
were largely based on rural forces, even if triggered by factors ranging from 
drought to resentment at foreign influence (Xiang 2003; Haw 1990; Shouyi 
1982). The theme of peasant rebellions would became a major one in 
Chinese Communist historiography and was often interpreted within the 
doctrines of class war and mass action (Unger 1993; Wright 1953).  
It is not surprising that the Communist leadership under Mao based their 
revolution largely on peasant support (rather than the urban proletariat) and 
that when the time came for capitalist reform, Deng Xiaoping tried to ensure 
that the welfare of China’s small farmers was well-buffered against inflation 
and displacement. Modernisation in the areas of agriculture was one of the 
first areas of reform in the 1980s (alongside industry, science and 
technology, and defence), with rural reform thereafter aimed at ensuring a 
prosperous class of farmers that would help buffer social stability even as 
society shifted towards “capitalism with Chinese characteristics.” Indeed, 
leaders down to Xi Jinping have sought to maintain a prosperous community 
of small farmers, in many cases interconnected into local labour flows and 
small-and-medium sized businesses operating around city fringes. This has 
been successful in some prosperous coastal regions, especially in more 
southern areas under intensive cultivation in wealthy provinces. However, 
elsewhere rural protests have intensified due to factors ranging across 
uncontrolled pollution, illegal land seizures and official corruption 
(Economy 2018; Li 2016). The PRC government has responded in part by 
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mainstreaming socialist and environmental policies since 2015 that seek a 
new comprehensive revision and assessment of land use: 
 
Across its entire 9,600,000 km2 of land area, China will establish four 
development categories - optimal development, targeted development, 
restricted development, and no development – overlaid with three principle 
functions: economic development in urbanized areas, agriculture in major 
farming areas, and ecological service in key areas of ecological functions 
(UNEP 2016, 6). 
 
Combined with intensified urbanisation trends (56 - 57% of the 
population living in cities in 2016, up from 44.3% in 2006), stricter 
environmental laws, and some buy back of land for re-forestation (Green-
for-Grain, centrally funded by $66.6 billion in the first round), this is 
changing the dynamics of food production in modern PRC (Statistica 2018b; 
UNEP 2016). 
Alongside these social tensions, the long-term impact on water, soil and 
biodiversity brought China to an emerging environmental crisis that was 
recognized from the late 1970s, but has only recently been integrated into 
national planning. The build-up of environmental pressures can be seen in 
the fate of the Yellow River, which until major revival schemes (run by the 
Yellow River Conservancy Commission) often did not reach the sea. In 
addition, pollution in the Yangtze and Pearl Rivers, desertification and soil 
erosion across north-west China, and massive air pollution in major cities in 
the north were also major problems (Lu et al. 2016; Watts 2011; Fu 2006). 
The modern expansion of agricultural production has also come at a high 
environmental cost, especially with excessive use of synthetic and natural 
fertilizers, plus heavy-metal contamination of farmland near cities and 
industrial areas, leading to a range of soil, water and health problems (Norse 
and Ju 2015). These factors resulted in a large-scale reassessment of the 
balance between environmental and agricultural policies (2007-2015), 
leading to the implementation of ambitious Eco-Civilization Targets for 
2020, comprehensive assessment of land use and upgrading of forest 
coverage to 23% (currently circa 21.66%), improving prairie vegetation 
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coverage of 56%, and 35% of natural shore-lines to be preserved, along with 
improved pollution and emissions legislation (UNEP 2016, 6, 38).  
Whether the ecological outcomes of these policies can be brought to 
fruition remains to be seen. Comparisons can be made of China to a large 
ship that is slow to turn, even with a decisive captain at the helm. However, 
in terms of follow-on environmental outcomes it may be wiser to think of 
these initiatives as a tug pulling a series of heavy barges on a long cable. A 
turn by the tug is transmitted by a series of intervening vectors and tensions, 
with delays in follow-through from government decision-making into 
economic and natural cycles.  Environmental remediation, in particular, may 
not be easily achieved in the early 2020 or 2030 national targets, although 
the government is now instituting ecological compensation schemes 
designed to channel spending into an environmental clean-up. This is largely 
based on funding from ministries and provincial governments, though 
liability insurance schemes for environmental pollution have been an 
increasing trend since 2007 and may become mandatory across some 
polluting industries, with 45,000 companies insured and $15.45 billion 
already set aside to such risks (UNEP 2016).  
 
 
FOOD SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY CONTEXT 
 
One of modern China’s great achievements has been the massive 
reduction of food scarcity, elimination of famine, and an overall reduction 
of national poverty levels; circa 700 million were lifted out of poverty 
through 1980-2011, thanks in part to targeted alleviation programs, land 
policy innovations and relocation schemes (Zhou et al. 2018). From the 
1960s there has been an expansion and intensification of grain, vegetable 
and fruit production, thereafter boosted by reforms following de-
collectivization and private use (but not ownership) of farmland. However, 
there has been an ecological cost associated with past patterns of improved 
food security: 
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China’s successful achievement of food security in recent decades has 
resulted in serious damage to the environment upstream of the agricultural 
sector, on farm and downstream. The environmental damage is biological, 
physical and chemical, particularly in terms of changes in soil processes 
and ecosystem function, with impacts at all levels from the local to the 
global. It has serious negative impacts on current and the long-term food 
security, and on the economy with estimated losses of up to 7% . . . of 
China’s agricultural GDP and 2% of gross national income (Norse and Ju 
2015, 5; for higher total costs including water and air pollution of up to 4 - 
9%, see Norse and Ju 2015, 6, 11). 
 
World Bank estimates suggest that up to 19.4% of PRC’s arable land is 
contaminated and that the arable land per capita has declined from 0.16 to 
0.09 hectares from 1961 to 2015 (World Bank 2018a). Furthermore, pockets 
of rural poverty remain a major concern for the CPC, along with serious gaps 
between rich and poor. President Xi Jinping’s New Year address at the end 
of 2015 still spoke of the domestic need for “green development that is also 
open and shared by all” and of the importance of getting “the tens of millions 
of rural population out of poverty” (Xi 2015). The government claimed to 
have lifted 66.63 million out of rural poverty through 2012-2015, but noted 
that 50 million in total were still below national poverty lines in 2016, with 
the 2016-2020 Five-Year Plan seeking to eliminate poverty by 2020 
(Xinhuanet 2015). Upgraded local infrastructure (especially road, water, and 
power links), better public services, improved land-use regulations and local 
resource benefit-sharing were outlined in the 13th Five-Year Plan, along with 
subsidies for ecological conservation (PRC 2016, Chapters 56-58). The 
government is now seeking more carefully to enforce and manage land use, 
as outlined in farmland protection regulations designed to ensure: “1) strict 
control over the conversion of cultivated land into non-cultivated land; 2) 
implementation of a system that charges for occupying farmland for non-
farming purposes; 3) strict protection of essential farmland; and 4) 
promotion of land development, reclamation, and consolidation” (UNEP 
2016, 13). 
An evolving area of concern has been China’s balanced management of 
its food security and environmental resources, based on better use of 
domestic farmland, limited food imports, plus some acquisition of farms and 
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food-processing facilities overseas. Food security has numerous definitions 
but at the basic level can be broadly defined as “when all people at all times 
have physical, social and economic access to food, which is safe and 
consumed in sufficient quantity and quality to meet their dietary needs and 
food preferences, and is supported by an environment of adequate sanitation, 
health services and care, allowing for a healthy and active life” (Committee 
on World Food Security, in Gibson 2012). Food security has to factor in 
major issues such as accessibility, availability, proper biological utilization 
and preparation, plus stability of prices and production (Gibson 2012). 
Modern China has greatly reduced nutrition problems since the early 1990s, 
with undernourishment falling from 24.5% in 1992 to 9.3 - 9.6% through 
2014-2015, with public concerns more focused on quality and safety of food, 
plus the ability to meet increased consumption of meat, fish and proteins 
(CSIS 2017; World Bank 2018b). 
Although domestic food production has generally increased since 1965 
(cereal production has increased from 173 million tons to over 580 million 
tons in 2016), the PRC is now a net food importer, with food imports slowly 
rising from 2008 to comprise circa 7% of total imports in 2015, with a slight 
drop to 6.53% in 2016 (World Bank 2018a; World Bank 2018c). China 
would prefer to be self-sufficient in staple grains (originally targeted at 90 - 
95%) but knows food imports could become critical in a world seeking to 
feed growing populations in Asia, Africa and South America (Niu et al. 
2017; Zhang 2016; Norse and Ju 2015; NTS 2010). Aligning these policies 
with the UN’s SDGs, China has sought to end hunger, achieve food security, 
and promote sustainable agriculture with the following targets: 
 
By 2020, maintain national grain production at above 600 billion 
kilograms, ensure ample supplies of wheat, grain, edible oil, meat, egg, 
milk, fruit, vegetable and tea, and ensure at least 97 percent of qualification 
rate in safety of major agricultural products. Strengthen the food security 
mechanism for needy groups, ensuring year-round safe, nutritious and 
ample food supply for all . . . . 
Implement the National Plan for Sustainable Agricultural 
Development (2015-2030). By 2020, ensure early positive results in 
sustainable agricultural development. By 2030, achieve notable progress 
in sustainable agricultural development and establish a new model of 
sustainable agricultural development featuring adequate supplies, high 
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resource efficiency, fertile farmlands, stable ecosystem, prosperous rural 
households, and pastoral beauty. Vigorously promote eco-friendly 
agriculture by promoting zero growth in fertilizers and pesticides. Launch 
circular agriculture demonstration projects and set up pilot zones of 
sustainable agricultural development (FMPRC 2016, 19; for circular 
agricultural systems with lower production and environmental costs, see 
Esposito et al. 2016; Troop et al. 2017). 
 
In the 2016-2020 Five-Year Plan the emphasis was on developing high 
quality farmland (development of 53 million hectares initially and 
eventually 67 million hectares), ensuring basic self-sufficiency in cereal 
grains, along with improved quality and safety of food products (PRC 2016). 
This includes better water conservancy, restoration of rural farmland, and 
strict control over the way agricultural land is used or converted for other 
purposes. The overall aim of current planning is to improve the quality of 
agriculture and to increase environmental protection by setting clear 
guidelines for land use and boundaries to protect intact ecological systems 
(UNEP 2016).  
However, the last Five-Year Plan also makes it clear that food security 
is based not just on domestic production, but requires international 
cooperation: 
 
We will improve mechanisms for regulating trade in agricultural 
products, optimize the mix of sources of imports, expand exports of 
competitive agricultural products while ensuring domestic supply, and 
appropriately increase imports of agricultural products that are in short 
supply at home. We will actively pursue agricultural cooperation and 
development overseas, establish large-scale offshore centers for farm 
product production, processing, storage, and transportation, and cultivate 
internationally competitive multinational agricultural companies. We will 
broaden the areas of international agricultural cooperation and support 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation in agricultural technology (PRC 
2016). 
 
Food investments and land acquisitions (on a limited but rising scale) by 
China have occurred in 33 countries, including Russia, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, sub-Saharan 
Africa, the US and Canada (Niu et al. 2017; CSIS 2017). Such purchases 
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can lead to tensions in bilateral relations: in Tajikistan some 1,500 Chinese 
farmers were brought in to grow rice in Khatlon province on 2000 hectares, 
as part of PRC’s food security agenda, leading to some local resentment, 
while there has been strong public criticism of farm acquisitions in countries 
as diverse Australia and Iceland (Eurasianet 2011). In Australia, China is 
the largest source of agribusiness investment, with over $2.5 billion spent 
on farms and related facilities, leading to treasury blockage of some 
purchases, such as of large cattle ranches comprising 2.5% of Australia’s 
total land area and of the major grain and oilseed producer GrainCorp (CSIS 
2017; Smith 2015). 
Increasing costs of staple foods and grains may continue due to the 
shifting impact of climate change and desertification. For example, it has 
been suggested that across wider Central Asia and parts of Africa: “in the 
next 25 years soil degradation could cause a 12% drop in global grain 
harvests, and a 30% rise in grain prices. Without a long-term strategy to 
resolve the problem, desertification will affect food supplies, cause 
migration and threaten the stability of many countries and regions” (Liu 
2016). In the long run, China may have to “maintain sufficient strategic food 
reserve which can meet the country’s food needs based on subsistence 
consumption level” during emergencies, but also improve its international 
food policies: 
 
To mitigate these risks, a global agricultural policy should be adopted, 
and this global agricultural policy should include the following five major 
components: agricultural import diversification, overseas agricultural 
investment, global agricultural cooperation, forming strategic trading 
partners and building global agricultural commodity exchange centers 
(Zhang 2016). 
 
However, these threat perceptions, triggered in part by the major global 
food supply crisis of 2008-2009, prices rises through 2010-2012, and 
continued pressure on domestic food prices in many developing countries 
through 2009-2017 (UN 2017a, 2017b; FAO 2018), should not be 
exaggerated. The PRC’s net need to import food, including a rise in protein 
and highly processed foods, has been beneficial to producers from the US, 
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France, the Netherlands, Australia, Brazil and many other countries and has 
even been a bargaining chip in recent US-China trade talks (Ng 2018). 
Although land grab scenarios have been exaggerated (Brautigam 2015), the 
PRC will still have to carefully calibrate the gains for its own food security 
programs in relation to the perceptions of partner states, especially along the 
BRI corridors (Ferguson 2018).  
 
 
CHALLENGING BUT NOT BEYOND REACH:  
ECO-CIVILIZATION AS SOCIETAL SECURITY 
 
These trends show that China’s food security is now being calibrated 
within the notion of an Eco-Civilizational transition, including increased 
care for ecological services and environmental costs.  Nonetheless, patterns 
of industrial pollution, overuse of fertilizers (both synthetic and natural), 
continued use of coal power and increased consumer demands have made 
this an enormous challenge for the Chinese government (Norse and Ju 
2015). The PRC leadership is now being tested by the need to balance a 
range of human societal needs, including economic, environmental, food, 
and health security. Put another way, a balanced Eco-Civilization approach 
would go a long way to enhancing personal and community needs, such as 
creating a subset of human security needs as identified by the UNDP from 
1994 onwards and now embedded in the UN SDGs. (FMPRC 2016; Dellios 
and Ferguson 2017; FAO 2016; Gomez and Gasper 2013; Albon 2009). The 
PRC pursues this in the context of a revised path towards “green socialism 
with Chinese characteristics.” Though the PRC has consciously linked its 
national planning with Climate Change and SDG agendas, there are limits 
to how far it can move in this direction. The Eco-Civilizational approach, 
insofar as it would entrench CPC’s leadership role rather than widen political 
liberties, would not meet the requirements for political security, human 
rights and the generalized freedom from fear outlined in UN frameworks 
(FAO 2016). However, its recognition of the need for interlinked economic, 
developmental and environmental governance at the national and global 
levels is the beginning of an informed globalism that might well evolve into 
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a truly planetary outlook, essential in a world increasingly impacted by 
human action.      
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